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█ Abstract In prior essays I have sketched a “modal model” of (self-) consciousness. That model “factors” 
out several distinct forms of awareness in the phenomenological structure of a typical act of conscious-
ness. Here we consider implications of the model à propos of contemporary theories of consciousness (e.g. 
higher-order and self-representational forms of awareness). In particular, we distinguish phenomenality 
from other features of awareness in a conscious experience: “what it is like” to have an experience in-
volves several different factors. Further, we should see these factors as typical of consciousness, rather 
than essential features, allowing that some elements of awareness may be absent while others are present 
in certain less typical cases. 
KEYWORDS: (Self-)consciousness; Higher-order Theories of Consciousness; Self-representational Theories 
of Consciousness; Phenomenality; Phenomenological Theories of Consciousness 
 
█ Riassunto I diversi elementi della (auto-)coscienza – In lavori precedenti ho cercato di proporre un “mo-
dello modale” della (auto)coscienza. Questo modello “considera” forme differenti e distinte di consapevo-
lezza che sono presenti nella struttura fenomenologica di un atto tipico di coscienza. Qui intendo conside-
rare alcune implicazioni di questo modello in relazione ad alcune teorie contemporanee della coscienza 
(tra cui, le teorie di alto livello della coscienza e le forme auto-rappresentazionali di consapevolezza). In 
particolare, distingueremo la fenomenicità da altre proprietà della consapevolezza all’interno di 
un’esperienza cosciente: il “che cosa si prova” a essere titolari un’esperienza implica elementi differenti e 
distinti. Inoltre, dovremo considerare questi elementi come caratteri tipici della coscienza e non come 
proprietà essenziali, riconoscendo che alcuni elementi della consapevolezza possono essere assenti, men-
tre altri sono presenti in alcuni casi meno frequenti. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: (Auto-)coscienza; Teorie della coscienza di alto livello;  Teorie auto-rappresentazionali 
della coscienza; Fenomenicità; Teorie fenomenologiche della coscienza 
 

█  Consciousness and self-consciousness 
 
AN INTUITIVE AND TRADITIONAL THEORY 
of consciousness holds that what makes a 
mental state or act conscious is a certain 
awareness of that activity. That type of 
awareness may be called self-consciousness: 
meaning not one’s consciousness of oneself, 
the subject of the mental act, but rather the 
act’s consciousness of itself. What is the form 
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or structure of that awareness? 
Following a line from Aristotle, Brentano 
argued that “inner consciousness” is an in-
trinsic and incidental part of consciousness. 
Each act of consciousness, Brentano held, in-
cludes both a primary consciousness of some 
object and a secondary consciousness of the 
act itself: as the act is “directed” toward its 
primary object and also incidentally toward 
itself. This secondary “inner consciousness”, 
Brentano argued, is not a form of “inner ob-
servation”, which would be a second act di-
rected toward the first: say, “introspection”, 
as practiced by subsequent psychologists; or 
“phenomenological reflection”, as practiced 
by Husserl and later phenomenologists; or 
“higher-order monitoring”, as appraised by 
recent theorists in philosophy of mind. 
Intrigued by Brentano’s notion of inner 
consciousness, by Husserl’s analysis of inner 
time-consciousness, and by Sartre’s concep-
tion of consciousness’s self-consciousness 
(conscience de soi), I set out, in The Structure 
of (Self-) Consciousness,1 to craft a basic analy-
sis of the structure of awareness that these 
thinkers took to be constitutive of con-
sciousness itself. In more recent essays I have 
amplified the basic idea in that early article. 
Here I should like to draw out some implica-
tions of what I’ve come to call the “modal 
model” of (self-) consciousness.2 
Briefly, the modal model of (self-) con-
sciousness factors out several different 
“modal” characters (as I call them) in the 
phenomenological structure of a typical con-
scious experience. These characters (to be 
specified shortly) define not the way the ob-
ject of consciousness is presented in an act of 
consciousness, but rather the way the act it-
self is experienced or carried out: that is, con-
sciously, with a certain form of awareness.  
My concern here is to emphasize the sep-
arable roles of these characters in the formal 
structure of a typical experience. These char-
acters define, if you will, “what it is like” to 
enact or live through the experience. Howev-
er, on the modal model, that what-it-is-like 
character is itself a structure incorporating 
the distinct “modal” characters singled out in 
the modal model of consciousness. 
 
█  Models of awareness in the theory of 
consciousness 
 
In recent decades philosophers have pro-
posed several different models of the aware-
ness that renders a mental state or act con-
scious. In 1986, as noted, I published an arti-
cle titled The Structure of (Self-) Conscious-
ness. There I proposed a formal model of the 
structure of inner awareness. In several es-
says in recent years I’ve amplified that basic 
analysis, in what I’ve come to call the “modal 
model” of consciousness, including “inner 
awareness”. I now want to bring out more 
explicitly the way in which that model distin-
guishes several distinct factors in the struc-
ture of an act of consciousness. 
These “modal” characters in an act of 
consciousness include: phenomenality, or 
how the experience “appears” in conscious-
ness; egocentricity, or how the “I” appears as 
subject of experience; inner awareness per se, 
or how the experience is reflexively experi-
enced as “this very experience”; a spatiotem-
poral sense of embodiment, of the “here and 
now” as experienced (say) in seeing some-
thing “here and now before me”; the species 
of conscious activity (e.g. seeing, thinking, 
willing, etc.). These modal characters modify 
the presentation of the object of conscious-
ness: that is, whereby the object is presented 
as such-and-such. (In the analytic tradition, 
intentionality is often assumed to require a 
propositional content, “that p”, but that as-
sumption is far too restrictive, and I’ll here 
work with the case of a visual presentation of 
an object with various properties, as opposed 
to a visual belief that the object has such-
and-such properties.) 
Meanwhile, a somewise parallel develop-
ment in philosophy of mind has produced 
competing models of the structure of aware-
ness that renders a mental act or state con-
scious. In 1986 David Rosenthal proposed 
the Higher-Order Thought analysis of this 
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form of awareness. In 1968 David Armstrong 
had proposed what has come to be called the 
Higher-Order Perception model of “inner 
sense”. By the 1990s a generalized model 
called Higher-Order Monitoring sought to 
capture the structure of self-consciousness: 
whether a kind of perception or a kind of 
thought or simply a kind of self-monitoring.  
These models all sought to preserve a mate-
rialist theory of mind, while recognizing the 
subjective experience of consciousness. Many 
proponents of higher-order monitoring have 
thought of this awareness-of-mind as a func-
tional or computational process, whereby a 
special form of information-processing con-
cerns the mental act itself, a meta-cognition. 
Other philosophers have resisted the reduc-
tion of awareness to functional processing – 
even as some proponents of phenomenal 
consciousness still seek a materialist theory 
of mind. 
Materialist, functionalist, and computa-
tional models of mind do not, however, cap-
ture the lived character of a conscious expe-
rience: what Thomas Nagel famously called 
“what it is like” for a being to be conscious, 
or to experience a conscious mental state. By 
contrast, Brentano simply assumed, if we 
may put it so, that consciousness has a phe-
nomenal character, an intrinsic quality he 
took to inhabit “inner consciousness”. In 
Brentano’s wake Husserl struggled to charac-
terize the structure of “inner time conscious-
ness”, the form of awareness of a flowing ex-
perience that embodies its “now” occurring 
while carrying “retentions” of just-past phas-
es of experience and “protentions” of about-
to-occur phases of the stream of conscious-
ness. Here I’ll assume a non-reductive ap-
proach to phenomenology, looking to phe-
nomenological structure in its own right (re-
gardless of how it is bound into neural func-
tion in a wider environment).3 
 
█  The modal model of consciousness 
 
In the modal model, I’ve sought to bring 
out the phenomenological structure charac-
teristic of conscious experience: or rather, I 
would now emphasize, a phenomeno-logical 
structure incorporating several distinct fac-
tors in the overall form of an act of con-
sciousness.4 
This modal model of consciousness is ul-
timately a theory of these several factors in 
the phenomenological structure of a typical 
conscious experience. Let me introduce the 
model (as I have elsewhere) in terms of a fa-
miliar type of experience. Perception is a for-
tuitous case study for phenomenology be-
cause it is rich in diverse content. In particu-
lar, visual experience is sensuous, cognitive, 
and embodied. As detailed by Husserl, Gur-
witsch, and Merleau-Ponty, the structure of 
visual consciousness is richly shaped by its 
place in the subject’s stream of consciousness, 
including bodily action, where the phenome-
nological form of “what is seen” is a fusion of 
sensory and cognitive content. Accordingly, 
we consider a visual experience occurring in a 
familiar everyday context. 
As I am gazing on my environs, a move-
ment catches my eye. A bird is swooping 
down from high in a fir tree, alighting on a 
bird-feeder nearby, its feet grasping the side of 
the feeder. It’s a woodpecker! How rare to see 
one up close. A red cape, black and white 
body, a long sharp beak. Skittish, as it seeks 
food while wary of its observer, me. This visu-
al experience we may characterize in a formal 
phenomenological description as follows: 
 
<Phenomenally in this very experience I 
now here see that swooping woodpecker>. 
 
There is much more to my experience 
than is captured in this formulation. My vis-
ual experience in seeing the bird swoop down 
and perch is itself a temporal flow in my con-
sciousness, a passing phase in my ongoing 
stream of consciousness. That flow of experi-
ence itself is part of my everyday activity in 
my world, as I look around, moving to see the 
flight of the woodpecker, all in relation to my 
“lived” body, in my surrounding “life-world”. 
What the formulation above does – in light 
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of the richness of that flow of experience – is 
to frame certain formal or logical features in 
the phenomenological structure of the visual 
experience so described. My task here is to 
distinguish certain “modal” factors in that 
structure: the factors articulated via the se-
ries of underscored expressions above (de-
tails to follow shortly). 
The angle brackets are meant to articulate 
not the words enclosed, but the phenomeno-
logical structure of the lived experience – al-
beit articulated by means of the words used: 
note the several types of indexical expression. 
The structure so articulated is what Husserl 
called the noematic content of the act of visual 
consciousness. Husserl used quotation marks 
in this way to “quote” the content of the ex-
perience described. However, the structural 
analysis at hand is not laid out by Husserl 
himself, but is guided by logical notions I 
borrow from Frege and Hintikka. 
The modal model divides the phenome-
nological structure of the exampled act into 
two basic parts. The mode of presentation in 
the act articulates the way the object of con-
sciousness appears or is presented in con-
sciousness: 
 
<that swooping woodpecker>. 
 
By contrast, the modality of presentation 
in the act articulates the way the act itself ap-
pears and is executed in presenting the object 
in a certain way: 
 
<Phenomenally in this very experience I 
now here see>. 
 
The term “presentation” is equivalent 
with “intention” or “intentionality”. The 
term “mode of presentation” is meant to res-
onate with both Frege’s and Husserl’s no-
tions of sense (Sinn), articulating the core 
content of the intentional experience, the ob-
ject-specifying content. The term “modality 
of presentation” is meant to resonate with 
Jaakko Hintikka’s notion of perceptual or 
intentional modality. For emphasis we might 
speak of the “modality of the act of presenta-
tion of the object”. Importantly, the modal 
model of consciousness would factor out sev-
eral distinctive elements within the full 
“modal” character of the experience at hand, 
within the complex structure articulated as 
the modality of presentation. I return to the 
Hintikkian aspect of my modal model below. 
 
█  Factoring out “modal” characters in an 
act of consciousness 
 
In the phenomenological description laid 
out above, I have underscored several logical-
ly distinct parts of the “modal” structure in 
the noematic content of the act so described 
– thus: 
 
<Phenomenally in this very experience I 
now here see>. 
 
These distinct factors in the noematic 
content embody importantly different char-
acters of the experience at hand. We may 
gloss the phenomenology of these characters 
as follows: 
 
<Phenomenally> – phenomenal character,  
 
<in this very experience> – inner aware-
ness, 
 
<I> – egocentricity, or orientation from 
the subject,  
 
<now here> – spatiotemporal awareness, 
 
<see> – act species. 
 
Each of these “modal” characters has been 
appraised in the phenomenological analyses 
richly detailed by Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and 
others. What the modal model of (self-) con-
sciousness does is to map out the formal or log-
ical structure of an act’s noematic content in a 
way that both distinguishes and binds togeth-
er the several factors cited just above. Phe-
nomenality is, if you will, the starting point of 
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phenomenology: what “appears” in con-
sciousness is spread out within the scope of 
this primordial character, what is “phenome-
nal” or so appearing in the given act of con-
sciousness. 
Inner awareness, as Brentano held, is a 
basic feature of the act’s “appearing” in the 
stream of consciousness. On the modal mod-
el, I have proposed, the form of inner aware-
ness is a reflexive indexical awareness: “in 
this very experience…”. On this model, inner 
awareness is distinct from phenomenality. 
Egocentricity is a form of orientation 
from the subject or “I” (“ego”), whereby the 
act is directed from the subject toward the 
presented object. Spatiotemporality is a mod-
ification of the subjective orientation of per-
ceptual experience in particular. Thus, I “in-
tend” the woodpecker from my locus in a 
phenomenal field within which the wood-
pecker appears. 
Act species is often ascribed to an act 
framed in the idiom of “propositional atti-
tudes”: seeing, judging, wishing, etc. – seeing 
that such-and-such, etc. However, we need 
not assume that the objective content is al-
ways propositional in form (<that ___>). In 
the above example, the objective or object-
presenting content is more appropriately cast 
in the form <that swooping woodpecker>, 
rather than <that that woodpecker is swoop-
ing downward>. The logical formation of the 
“modal” content binds these distinct factors 
of content together in the modal structure: 
 
<Phenomenally in this very experience I 
now here see>. 
 
All of the underscored elements of “mod-
al” content – the modality-of-presentation – 
articulate forms of awareness in the experi-
ence at hand: phenomenal awareness, inner 
awareness, subjective awareness, spatiotem-
poral awareness, visual awareness. And this 
complex modal content modifies the act’s 
mode-of-presentation of the object of con-
sciousness, articulated by the object-presenting 
content <that swooping woodpecker>. 
These five forms of modal content define 
distinct aspects of awareness in an act of con-
sciousness. As characterized above, they per-
form different functions in the phenomeno-
logical structure of the act. Accordingly, I 
have marked out different “slots” for them in 
the modal content of the experience. 
The history of phenomenology – from 
roots in Descartes and Hume to elaborate 
analyses in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and oth-
ers – approaches these modal characters, as it 
were, one by one. Phenomenality is a basic 
feature seemingly taken for granted from 
Descartes onward into Kant and beyond; the 
term “phenomena” means appearance, that is, 
in consciousness.  
“Inner” awareness is pinpointed by Bren-
tano as “inner consciousness”. And inner 
awareness is given further structure in Hus-
serl’s analysis of “inner time-consciousness”. 
Awareness of one’s self is a running theme 
from Descartes through Hume and Kant into 
Husserl and into Sartre. Spatiotemporality 
appears as embodied consciousness, richly de-
tailed in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. And so 
on. However, what the modal model offers is 
an explicit logical, or phenomeno-logical, 
structure that both separates and unites these 
several distinct factors of (self-) consciousness. 
In recent philosophy of mind, I would note, 
phenomenality and subjectivity have vied for 
prominence. “What it is like” to have a con-
scious experience has been the leading notion 
in recent consciousness theory.5 Some theorists 
emphasize “phenomenal” character as defining 
consciousness and what it is like;6 other theo-
rists emphasize “subjective” character, or what 
it is like for the subject.7 The modal model, 
however, factors what-it-is-like into some five 
distinct factors of (self-)consciousness. It fol-
lows that we should not try to define what ren-
ders an experience conscious solely in terms of 
any one of these factors. 
 
█  Typical, not essential, factors 
 
Many philosophers seek analysis in the 
form of necessary and sufficient conditions: 
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here, for a mental act to be conscious. The de-
bate then centers on a proffered condition, or 
counter-examples thereto. Following that form 
of analysis, then, the Higher-Order Monitoring 
theory of consciousness would hold: 
 
A mental act A is conscious if and only if A 
includes a proper part of A that consists 
in a higher-order monitoring of A [say, a 
higher-order thought or perception that 
represents A in an appropriate way]. 
 
If the modal model is to be formulated in 
terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, 
then it would hold: 
 
A mental act A is conscious if and only if A 
includes a proper part whose content in-
cludes the modal structure <Phenomenally 
in this very experience I now here> [and so 
A includes a reflexive awareness of A]. 
 
Now, the form of necessary-and-sufficient 
conditions gives a misleading analysis of 
what makes a mental act conscious. 
For starters, there is a problem of whether 
the proferred defining condition is logically 
or perhaps conceptually necessary-and-
sufficient, or instead psychologically or neuro-
physiologically necessary-and-sufficient, that 
is, according to principles of empirical psy-
chology or neurobiology. Or better: a condi-
tion that is phenomenologically necessary-
and-sufficient, that is, according to principles 
of phenomenology, rather than principles of 
either logic or neurobiology.  
I am assuming we need a theory of phe-
nomenological structure per se, perhaps 
along lines of the Husserlian conception of 
ideal “noematic” content. However we work 
out that issue, I submit, we should not frame 
the modal model of consciousness in terms of 
necessary-and-sufficient conditions on the 
modal content of an experience. Rather, we 
should view the model as defining a complex 
form of awareness that factors out modal 
characters of experience that are typical, ra-
ther than essential, factors in consciousness.  
We should think of the distribution of 
these modal characters as something like a 
bell curve. These modal characters come to-
gether in a typical act of conscious, a form of 
experience that we adult human beings ra-
ther typically experience. In certain cases, 
though, some of these modal characters may 
be absent. These cases should not be seen as 
counter-examples to the model, but rather as 
relative outliers in the distribution of the 
forms of awareness we find, phenomenologi-
cally, in our experience. (Empirical studies 
may find which parts of the neural system are 
active in various forms of consciousness, and 
which parts may be silent even in a conscious 
experience. But such studies lie beyond, and 
presuppose, the phenomenological analysis 
of forms of consciousness.) 
A common experience is where you are 
driving a familiar stretch of road and lost in 
thought. Many philosophers take this case to 
show that there is no inner awareness of your 
driving. But we should not say you are driv-
ing unconsciously (please do not!). Rather, 
we may allow that inner awareness — of “this 
very experience” — is absent or certainly 
muted in this case. Similarly, many philoso-
phers find persuasive the claim that con-
sciousness is typically or even essentially 
“transparent” or “diaphanous”, in that con-
sciousness is intentionally directed outward 
toward some object (say, the deep-red rose 
visually before me), but with no particular 
awareness whatsoever of the experience it-
self. This claim is only plausible in cases 
where the subject’s attention is wholly ab-
sorbed in the object of consciousness. What 
we should say is not that consciousness is es-
sentially transparent, but rather that in some 
cases the sense of inner awareness is either 
absent or muted. 
A venerable claim has it that in deep med-
itation all sense of “self” disappears, yet one 
is not only conscious, but purportedly in a 
deep and altered state of “pure” conscious-
ness with no sense of self. We should not 
then say that this state is without conscious-
ness, hence without any experiential charac-
The Several Factors of (Self)Consciousness  
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ter (of what it is like for the subject?). Rather, 
we may allow that egocentricity – awareness 
of “I” (“this very subject”) – is absent in this 
state of consciousness (as has long been held 
by Buddhist practitioners of deep medita-
tion). At a more mundane level, we have all 
frequently experienced activities where we 
are focused intently on what we are doing 
(think of a watch-maker repairing a tiny ele-
ment in a watch). In such an immersive expe-
rience, the sense of self or “I” virtually disap-
pears, yet one is conscious, and vividly aware 
of what one is doing. 
When I am thinking intently on a philo-
sophical problem, I become “lost in thought”. 
Even as I am typing out my verbalized pat-
tern of thought, my sense of spatiotemporal 
embodiment – of being “here now” as I so 
think and type – may virtually disappear. 
And yet my activity of thinking is conscious. 
Observing cases like these, then, we should 
view the modal model of (self-) conscious-
ness as marking out a pattern of awareness in 
which one or more of these modal characters 
is either absent or at least so muted that, well, 
we hardly notice. And yet this complex form 
of awareness,  
 
<Phenomenally in this very experience I 
now here>, 
 
is characteristic of everyday conscious-
ness: according to the phenomenological 
analysis formulated in the modal model. 
 
 
█  Phenomenality in cognitive phenomenol-
ogy and beyond 
 
As philosophers of mind have turned to 
phenomenal consciousness, the question has 
arisen: What types of mental activity have a 
phenomenal character of what-it-is-like? A 
conservative empiricist view holds that only 
purely sensuous experiences, such as seeing a 
red round patch, are actually phenomenal. A 
more liberal view holds that consciously 
thinking that p (whatever the content <p>) 
has its own distinctive phenomenal charac-
ter. Again, on the liberal phenomenological 
approach, perception is typically both sensu-
ous and cognitively informed. And so, in the 
case of my experience in seeing this black-
and-white-and-red woodpecker swooping 
toward the feeder, this conscious visual expe-
rience has its own distinctive phenomenal 
character – its own partly sensuous and part-
ly cognitive “phenomenology”.8 
I myself have argued for a classical phe-
nomenological view that every conscious ex-
perience – especially every conscious inten-
tional experience – has its own bona fide 
phenomenal character. This is practically 
tautological, in my view. In any event, wher-
ever phenomenality plays in various types of 
conscious mental activity, I would emphasize 
here that the modal model provides a struc-
tured framework within which to define the 
role of phenomenality.9  
Thus, a purely sensuous experience might 
have the structure: 
  
<phenomenally I now see this red round 
patch>, 
 
 or perhaps more simply: 
 
<phenomenally there now appears this/a 
red round patch>. 
 
A purely cognitive conscious thought 
might have the structure: 
 
<phenomenally I now think that Mer-
leau-Ponty was right>. 
 
And a conscious volitional action might 
have the structure: 
 
<phenomenally I now here swing this 
racket in my backhand style>. 
 
Again, a typical, richly contentful, visual 
experience might have the structure: 
 
<phenomenally I now here see this 
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swooping red-caped woodpecker>. 
 
Moving beyond the quotidian range of 
Lebenswelt experience, we may find that a 
“no-self” experience in Buddhist meditation 
has the structure: 
 
<phenomenally there now appears this 
feeling of joy>, 
 
or in an advanced meditative state of 
“pure” consciousness: 
 
<phenomenally there appears this present 
field of consciousness>. 
 
And similarly we may apply the modal 
modal of the structure of consciousness to 
other forms of experience as well. The modal 
model parses several distinct “slots”, or struc-
tural forms, that may be filled appropriately. 
And in each such form of experience the 
modal content <phenomenally> inflects the 
overall experience in such a way that “there is 
something it is like” to have the experience. 
We may say phenomenality rules in phenom-
enology. 
Now, the phenomenal character of an ex-
perience is sometimes characterized as the 
quality of “what it is like for me” and so from 
the first-person perspective.10 Importantly, 
however, the modal model separates phe-
nomenality per se from egocentricity. What 
it is like “for me” is transformed into what it 
is like as enacted “by me”, or in active voice 
what it is like as “I see/think/ …”. Arguably, 
to be experienced as enacted “by me”, or as 
being directed “from me”, entails being expe-
rienced as occurring “for me” (the differences 
are variations in surface grammar). In any 
case, the <I> structure of consciousness 
needs to be distinguished from the overarch-
ing structure <phenomenally>.  
This distinction allows us to recognize 
experiences where the “I” is absent, as in cer-
tain forms of meditation (noted earlier) 
where consciousness is experienced as with-
out a “self”. Yet even in a “self”-rooted expe-
rience, we should see, the “self” aspect of the 
experience is distinct from its “what it is like” 
aspect per se.11 
 
█  The logic of modal structures of (self-) 
consciousness 
 
In the lineage of phenomenology, from 
Brentano into Husserl into Sartre, we find a 
basic view of pre-reflective awareness that is 
arguably constitutive of consciousness — at 
least in the forms of intentional conscious-
ness ubiquitous in everyday experience.  
As noted at the outset, my own “modal” 
model of (self-) consciousness began with 
basic pre-reflective inner awareness. Howev-
er, on my analysis, this basic form of aware-
ness exhibits a number of distinguishable fac-
tors: that is the point of the present essay, to 
emphasize this factored structure in typical 
consciousness. Again, there are, I believe, ra-
ther special forms of consciousness that are 
not so highly structured. I certainly count 
many other living beings as having bona fide 
consciousness without this variety of “self-
consciousness”. At any rate, the form of 
awareness at stake here is a structured 
awareness typical of many forms of phenom-
enal intentional consciousness that we com-
monly experience. 
The complexity of awareness articulated 
in the modal model follows two types of 
analysis that are not reflected in any way in 
current discussions.12 Here I should like to 
emphasize how these two types of analysis 
play in the modal model discussed above. 
One model derives from Jaakko Hintikka’s 
model for “intentional modalities” such as 
belief and (especially) perception.13 The oth-
er model derives from Edmund Husserl’s 
model of “noematic content” under my own 
detailed reconstruction.14  
From Hintikka’s analysis of the logic of 
perception sentences I want to draw a model 
of the formal structure of an intentional ex-
perience such as perception. And within that 
structure, looking to Husserlian phenome-
nology, I want to define certain formal struc-
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tures of consciousness as articulated in the 
modal model of (self-) consciousness. 
In his Models for Modalities, Hintikka 
showed how “propositional attitudes” such as 
belief and perception have a formal structure 
akin to that of the metaphysical modalities of 
possibility and necessity. Intentionality is 
thus conceived as a modal structure, where 
an attitude is related to things in various 
“possible worlds”, and we may speak accord-
ingly of intentional modalities including be-
lief, perception, etc.15 
In particular, Hintikka’s logic of percep-
tion treats “A sees that p” as a modal sen-
tence akin to “it is necessary that p”. Thus, in 
Hintikka’s logic, “A sees that the woodpecker 
is swooping down to the feeder” means, 
roughly, that in every perceptually possible 
situation compatible with what A sees, it is 
the case that the woodpecker is swooping 
down to the feeder. By analogy, “it is neces-
sary that p” means that in every metaphysi-
cally possible world, it is the case that p. 
Building upon an ontology of possible situa-
tions or worlds, then, we may follow Hin-
tikka’s lead in distinguishing intentionally 
possible situations, which are far more re-
stricted in type than metaphysically possible 
situations or worlds. The latter types of pos-
sibilities have dominated philosophers’ atten-
tion, largely to the exclusion of intentional 
possibilities: that is, situations compatible 
only with phenomenological contents of in-
tentional acts or attitudes. 
Hintikka’s logic of perception is set with-
in the framework of modal logic, specifically, 
in the style of possible-worlds semantics fol-
lowing model-theoretic semantics. Husserl’s 
conception of logic preceded developments 
in mathematical logic in the works of Car-
nap, Gödel, Tarski, among others, prior to 
Hintikka’s work in modal logic. In particular, 
Husserl’s conception of “pure logic” in his 
Logical Investigations (1900-01)16 sought to 
correlate structures of language, structures of 
thought or conscious experience, and struc-
tures of things in the surrounding world.17 As 
we approach the logic of perception sentenc-
es in relation to the phenomenology of per-
ception, we bear in mind the effects of differ-
ent methodologies.  
Briefly, mathematical logic defines formal 
structures that abstract away from the rich-
ness of both ordinary language and everyday 
experience. What I’ve called the “modality” 
of presentation in (say) an act of perception 
embraces a wider range of “modal” aspects of 
the perceptual experience – carrying us be-
yond the basic formal structure of perception 
that is indicated in Hintikka’s semantics for 
sentences ascribing perceptual experience. 
Thus, on my development of the modal 
model of consciousness, the modal character 
in an act of perception begins à la Hintikka 
with the structure <I see that …>, and that 
structure is extended to encompass further 
phenomenological elements of “modality”: 
thus, <phenomenally in this very experience 
I now here see …> – combining several dis-
tinct aspects of (self-) consciousness beyond 
<… I see …>. 
As Ronald McIntyre and I detailed in 
Husserl and Intentionality,18 Husserl’s theory 
of “noematic” content or meaning (Sinn) in-
volved a rich conception of the “horizon” of 
anticipated possibilities compatible with the 
content of a given intentional experience. 
These horizonal modifications refine the in-
tentional focus of an experience with a given 
content.  
In our featured case above, a Husserlian-
Hintikkian analysis finds that my visual experi-
ence presents me intentionally with, well, that 
swooping red-caped woodpecker, heading for 
the feeder on the deck. Of course, my prior ex-
perience with birds and their flight and their 
feeding interests shapes what I now see: “that 
swooping woodpecker”. But that item of con-
tent carries a rich horizon of “motivated” back-
ground meaning that constrains what I see.  
For example, it is quite possible that the 
woodpecker will alight on the feeder and perch 
nervously on its side, or it is quite possible that 
it will veer off when it/she/he spies me.  
However, it is not a motivated possibility, 
for my visual experience, that the woodpeck-
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er will drop a cherry bomb on the feeder, or 
that it will choose to attack me as I admire it. 
The horizon of motivated possibilities is rich 
and wide and indeterminate. For the record, 
the appropriate possibilities are not explicitly 
represented; they are merely implicit and 
vaguely tied into my current experience.19 
Now we are ready to invoke a more spe-
cific feature of the structure of the “noematic 
content” of an experience. Husserl distin-
guished the object-presenting content or Sinn 
in an experience from what he called the 
“thetic character” of the experience. In the 
present case the thetic character includes the 
quality of visual experience per se, that is, see-
ing (rather than hearing) the swooping bird. 
And once we recognize this formally distinct 
thetic structure in the noematic content of 
the experience, we may begin to parse out 
further modifying characters. I see the 
woodpecker clearly (rather than vaguely); I 
presently see it swooping (“now” in the tem-
poral flow of my stream of consciousness); I 
see it within my situated embodied circum-
stance (“here”, as I sit facing the bird feeder 
and the swooping woodpecker). Further, 
well, of course, it is in this very experience that 
I am seeing the swooping bird. And, crucially, 
it is phenomenally within my stream of expe-
rience that I see the swooping woodpecker. 
Of course, these distinct “thetic” charac-
ters in my experience are precisely the dis-
tinct factors of conscious awareness – “mod-
al” characters – that are parsed in the modal 
model of (self-) consciousness. The full phe-
nomenological content of my experience – 
what Husserl called its ideal “noematic con-
tent” – is accordingly mapped out in the ar-
ticulated phenomenological description set 
out above: 
 
<Phenomenally in this very experience I 
now here see that swooping woodpecker>. 
 
With these details in mind, then, I would 
underscore how the ideal phenomenological 
structure of the experience is factored into the 
several formal “slots” appraised in the full con-
tent of the experience: the slots of phenome-
nality, inner awareness, egocentricity, locality, 
act-type, and object-presenting sense. 
Without here elaborating on the ontology 
of meaning, I would defer to the detailed re-
construction of Husserl’s theory of noematic 
content in my Husserl.20 On such a line of 
theory: the logic of consciousness includes the 
phenomenology of experience, which in turn 
includes the ontology of meaning-content. 
 
█  A Postscript on propositional content 
 
Many philosophers of mind, working in 
the tradition of analytic philosophy, focus on a 
narrow conception of intentionality whereby a 
“propositional attitude” consists simply in an 
attitude plus a propositional content. In the 
case at hand, this type of analysis would find 
in my experience: the propositional content 
<that woodpecker is swooping down toward 
the feeder> plus the attitude <visual percep-
tion>. Well, that’s a start. But there’s more.  
First, intentional content or Sinn does not 
always take a propositional form, which pre-
sents or “intends” a fact or state of affairs. It 
is one thing to see an individual “this wood-
pecker”, and it is another thing to see a state 
of affairs or situation to the effect that “this 
bird is a woodpecker” – as Husserl rightly 
emphasized. Second, there is more to the 
content of an experience than its act-type 
(say, seeing) and its object-presenting con-
tent (say, <that swooping woodpecker>). 
The modal model marks out further ele-
ments in what I called the “modal” character 
of an experience. 
In philosophy of mind, as John Searle 
turned from speech act theory to intentionali-
ty theory,21 he defined an intentional state as 
an intentional state type with a propositional 
content, the latter defined by its conditions of 
satisfaction. So for Searle the structure of an 
intentional experience is basically: state-type 
+ proposition. In logical theory, Hintikka’s 
semantics for propositional attitudes22 as-
sumes that a propositional attitude takes the 
form of an attitude in relation to a proposi-
The Several Factors of (Self)Consciousness  
 
301 
tion, where the propositional content of the 
attitude is defined, as noted above, in terms of 
intentionally possible situations or “worlds”. 
Hintikka’s logic can be set in a wider con-
text resonant with Husserlian intentionality 
theory. For each attitude the logical semantics 
assumes a relation between the attitude and its 
truth in relevantly possible “worlds” or situa-
tions. This style of semantics reflects a theory 
of intentionality whereby an act of conscious-
ness is, as it were, directed toward appropriate 
things in a relevant range of intentionally pos-
sible worlds. By assuming that an intentional 
attitude has at least this basic structure, Hin-
tikka then can define truth-conditions for a 
sentence ascribing the attitude. In the case 
considered above, we then say: “A sees that 
the woodpecker is swooping down” is true in 
every perceptually possible situation or world 
in which the woodpecker is swooping down, 
that is, in that possible world.23 
The focus on propositional structure in 
intentional experience is helpful where the 
content of an experience is either expressible 
in language, as Husserl considered in Logical 
Investigations, or inflected by language, as 
many of our conceptual structures surely are, 
or arguably grounded in one’s language, at a 
sub-conscious level of “deep structure” where 
subject-predicate syntax rules. However, we 
do not live by language-shaped experience 
alone. Perceptual experience, experience in 
volitional action, and deep emotional experi-
ence all seem to have their own proper phe-
nomenological forms. Accordingly, I have 
focused above on a simple form of visual ex-
perience that is not primarily shaped by our 
language, even though in my own experience 
the visual content <woodpecker> is shaped 
by the language of others familiar with such 
remarkable creatures. 
I have framed the modal model of (self-) 
consciousness in a form inspired by the syn-
tax of modal logic, following Hintikka’s logic 
of perception and of propositional attitudes 
in general. How to translate this model into a 
theory of basic phenomenological structures 
is part of what Husserl called the “infinite 
task” of phenomenology. In today’s science 
of consciousness that would mean plumbing 
the depths of neurological structure to better 
understand lived phenomenological structure 
– a task for many other days. 
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